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 BEYOND DECEPTION: FINDING PRUDENTIAL 
BOUNDARIES BETWEEN BREACH OF CONTRACT 
AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT 
VIOLATIONS IN WISCONSIN 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It has been said that the law of contracts is an abstraction, a residual 
component destined to disappear among advancing bodies of other law.
1
  
Professor Grant Gilmore was of such a mind, forecasting that contract, 
together with tort law, would assimilate into a ―generalized theory of civil 
obligation.‖2  Others have identified the swift progression of regulation, 
uniform codes, and statutory law as the driving force in obviating the common 
law of contracts.
3
  Wisconsin is currently in the midst of wrestling with this 
exact issue; that is, the destiny of contracts and contract law.  Wisconsin, by 
adopting a strong economic loss doctrine,
4
 has shown particular distaste for 
the immersion of tort and contract predicted by Gilmore.
5
  But the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court‘s economic loss jurisprudence does not similarly foreclose the 
potential for statutory law to replace the role of contracts.  The court has 
indicated that facts giving rise to a breach of contract claim may also support 
recovery under the state‘s Deceptive Trade Practices Act6 (the DTPA).7  Thus, 
 
1. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CASE STUDY 22–25 (1965); GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 103–10 (Ronald K.L. 
Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995). 
2. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 103.   
3. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 202–10; see generally Mark D. Rosen, What Has Happened to 
the Common Law?—Recent American Codifications, and Their Impact on Judicial Practice and the 
Law’s Subsequent Development, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1119. 
4. The economic loss doctrine ―preclude[s] contracting parties from pursuing tort recovery for 
purely economic or commercial losses associated with the contract relationship.‖  Van Lare v. Vogt, 
Inc., 2004 WI 110, ¶ 19, 274 Wis. 2d 631, 683 N.W.2d 233 (quoting Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, 
Inc. 2004 WI 32, ¶ 23, 270 Wis. 2d 146, 677 N.W.2d 233).  Its purpose is to ―preserve the distinction 
between contract and tort by requiring transacting parties to pursue only their contractual remedies 
when asserting an economic loss claim.‖  Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec., Inc., 2004 WI 139, ¶ 24, 
276 Wis. 2d 361, 688 N.W.2d 462.  In other words, the economic loss doctrine prevents parties from 
asserting tort claims for what amounts to a breach of contract.  It is the strengthening of this doctrine 
in Wisconsin and the attendant prohibition on tort recovery as an alternative to contract that has 
animated the increased usage of statutory causes of action in contract disputes, which is the main 
concern of this Comment. 
5. See Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 216 Wis. 2d 395, 403–04, 573 N.W.2d 842, 
846 (1998) (stating that the purpose of the economic loss doctrine is to maintain the distinction 
between tort and contract law). 
6. WIS. STAT. § 100.18(1) (2007–2008). 
7. See, e.g., Below v. Norton, 2008 WI 77, ¶ 42, 310 Wis. 2d 713, 751 N.W.2d 351. 
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while the distinction between contract and tort law grows crisper, that 
between contract and statutory causes of action is becoming significantly 
blurrier.  Indeed, there have been at least twenty-five appellate cases between 
2000 and 2010 in which the plaintiff, using the same nucleus of fact, pled a 
DTPA violation in conjunction with a breach of contract claim.
8
 
The recent case K & S Tool & Die Corp. v. Perfection Machinery Sales, 
Inc. (K & S) demonstrates how this trend, if left unchecked, can go too far.
9
  
The subject matter in K & S was a dispute between two commercial parties 
over a transaction involving the purchase of manufacturing equipment.
10
  The 
defendant seller had breached its contract—it agreed to sell one piece of 
machinery to the plaintiff but actually delivered another.
11
  However, despite 
the fact that the purchase was under contract, the plaintiff based its entire 
action on the DTPA and ultimately prevailed.
12
  This raises the question: 
What becomes of the parties‘ contract when an action for breach is brought 
solely under the DTPA?  The contract in K & S was obviously unnecessary as 
a condition for imposing liability, and consequently, one could argue that 
K & S provides authority for courts to ignore contracts completely where a 
DTPA violation is concerned.  This, in turn, could afford litigants an 
opportunity to avoid unfavorable but legitimate contract terms simply by 
recasting their ordinary contract claims as DTPA violations.  In other words, it 
 
8. Below, 2008 WI 77; Van Lare, 2004 WI 110; Tietsworth, 2004 WI 32, ¶ 2; Seidling v. 
Stepan, No. 2008AP1009, 2009 WL 3273229, ¶ 3 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2009); Racine County v. 
Oracular Milwaukee, Inc., 2009 WI App 58, ¶ 7, 317 Wis. 2d 790, 767 N.W.2d 280; WED Dev. 
LLC v. ABC Ins., No. 2008AP977, 2009 WL 691166, ¶ 8 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2009); Blanchar v. 
Lake Land Builders, Inc., No. 2008AP1282, 2008 WL 5397173, ¶¶ 1, 1 n.3 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 
2008); Christensen v. TDS Metrocom LLC, No. 2008AP554, 2008 WL 5172804 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 
11, 2008); Armstrong v. Zima, No. 2007AP1950, 2008 WL 3389301, ¶ 3 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 
2008); Renaissance Learning, Inc. v. Omron Corp., No. 2007AP2173, 2008 WL 3389702, ¶ 7 (Wis. 
Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2008); Berard v. Schertz, No. 2007AP2131, 2008 WL 2245868, ¶ 5 (Wis. Ct. App. 
June 3, 2008); Aslani v. Country Creek Homes, Inc., No. 2007AP503, 2008 WL 220714, ¶¶ 1, 4 
(Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2008); Nissenbaum v. Daniels, No. 2006AP1042, 2007 WL 823934, ¶¶ 9, 
9 n.1 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2007); 3303-05 Marina Road, LLC v. Zennett Props., LLC, 
No. 2005AP2293, 2006 WL 2670963 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2006); Converting/Biophile Labs., 
Inc. v. Ludlow Composites Corp., 2006 WI App 187, ¶¶ 9, 11, 296 Wis. 2d 273, 722 N.W.2d 633; 
Malzewski v. Rapkin, 2006 WI App 183, ¶¶ 1, 6, 296 Wis. 2d 98, 723 N.W.2d 156; Peterson v. 
Cornerstone Prop. Dev., LLC, 2006 WI App 132, ¶ 10, 294 Wis. 2d 800, 720 N.W.2d 716; Madcap I, 
LLC v. McNamee, 2005 WI App 173, ¶ 4, 284 Wis. 2d 774, 702 N.W.2d 16; Winkelman v. Kraft 
Foods, Inc., 2005 WI App 25, ¶¶ 3, 5, 279 Wis. 2d 335, 693 N.W.2d 756; Ricco v. Riva, 2003 
WI App 182, ¶ 3, 266 Wis. 2d 696, 669 N.W.2d 193; Selzer v. Brunsell Bros., 2002 WI App 232, 
¶ 8, 257 Wis. 2d 809, 652 N.W.2d 806; Kailin v. Armstrong, 2002 WI App 70, ¶ 1, 252 Wis. 2d 676, 
643 N.W.2d 132; Kain v. Bluemound E. Indus. Park, Inc., 2001 WI App 230, ¶ 6, 248 Wis. 2d 172, 
635 N.W.2d 640; Reusch v. Roob, 2000 WI App 76, ¶ 5, 234 Wis. 2d 270, 610 N.W.2d 168. 
9. 2007 WI 70, 301 Wis. 2d 109, 732 N.W.2d 792. 
10. Id., ¶ 1. 
11. Id., ¶¶ 8–10. 
12. Id., ¶¶ 11, 14, 17, 42. 
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seems as though the K & S court sanctioned a loophole through which parties 
may litigate what is in fact an ordinary contract dispute under the DTPA, and 
as a result, obtain unwarranted advantages under the statute‘s relaxed 
substantive requirements and fee-shifting provisions. 
Contract law is a doctrine of mechanical rules subject to variation by the 
contracting parties.  So-called ―freedom to contract‖ permits parties to 
voluntarily adjust their rights and responsibilities by specifying their own 
terms to which they can expect to be bound.  The law, recognizing the societal 
value in enforcing contracts, makes it incredibly difficult for a party to escape 
its promises once the contract is made.
13
  However, by allowing recovery for 
breach of contract under the DTPA, the supreme court has made it 
significantly easier for parties to ―opt out‖ of their contract‘s terms just by 
asserting a DTPA claim.  Therefore, the extent to which courts will apply 
K & S and enforce the DTPA over contracts will have a dramatic effect on 
parties‘ ability to escape the terms of their agreements ex post facto. 
The thesis of this Comment is that, for the benefit of our contract-based 
system of economic exchange, prudential boundaries between ordinary 
contract disputes and DTPA violations are needed to preserve the difference 
between the two.  The following discussion will cover the DTPA story that is 
currently unfolding in the state‘s contract jurisprudence, its implications, and 
the prudential boundaries that should be considered to check its growth.  
Part II covers the DTPA basics—its purpose, elements, and specifically its 
application in K & S.  Part III explores the potential consequences of the 
precedent set in K & S—particularly its effect on parties‘ ability to effectively 
and reliably allocate economic risks.  Part IV, assuming that the K & S trend 
will continue, raises two major issues courts should confront when they apply 
the DTPA in this manner.  The first issue is whether a breach of contract, 
without more, is indeed a true DTPA violation or rather an injury best left to 
contract law.  This Comment argues that a breach of contract, by itself, should 
remain a matter of contract law.  The second issue recognizes that application 
of the DTPA to breach of contract claims will eventually run afoul of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.).  The U.C.C. permits contracting parties 
to agree to terms with which the DTPA is at complete odds.
14
  The resulting 
conflict that will confront Wisconsin courts is one between two completely 
 
13. However, the struggle to find ways to balance private autonomy exercised through freedom 
of contract with notions of fundamental fairness in commercial transactions is well documented.  See 
Carolyn Edwards, Freedom of Contract and Fundamental Fairness for Individual Parties: The Tug 
of War Continues, 77 UMKC L. REV. 647, 647–55 (2009).  With mixed success, courts have begun 
to integrate doctrines—such as promissory estoppel, unconscionability, and good faith—into contract 
law that eradicate contract formalism to relieve society of private agreements that violate notions of 
fundamental fairness.  Id.   
14. See infra Part IV.B. 
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opposite standards of contracting required by the two different statutes.  Thus, 
courts must determine whether contract terms entered in compliance with the 
U.C.C. can survive the DTPA when the two bodies of statutory law conflict.  
Part IV will attempt to outline some guidelines aimed toward resolving these 
issues.  The DTPA has its purpose, and courts should not unduly hinder the 
statute from accomplishing that purpose.  However, by setting aside valid, 
freely bargained-for contracts to enforce the DTPA, the supreme court is 
visiting unjustifiable harm upon contract law without advancing the DTPA‘s 
purpose.  Contracts still play a fundamental role in law and society by 
protecting agreements that are the lifeblood of our economic system.  The 
DTPA should not be a tool for scrapping this essential institution. 
II.  WISCONSIN‘S DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT 
A.  Generally 
The DTPA is born out of a perception that the high costs to society of 
investigating, prosecuting, and rectifying economic harm caused by deception 
or trickery are not adequately addressed by common law contract or tort 
remedies.
15
  Common law actions require proof of such things as an actual 
injury, fraud, mistake, unconscionability, reliance, or intent.
16
  Given the 
substantive barriers imposed by the common law, a statutory cause of action 
for deceptive trade practices was needed because, as one commentator noted, 
―it is more efficient for the law to recognize an obligation in sellers not to 
deceive their customers and to provide remedies that effectively deter that 
behavior.‖17  Accordingly, state legislatures across the country have adopted 
statutes, such as the DTPA and others like it, with an aim to relax the 
substantive requirements on recovering economic losses caused by deceptive 
and unfair sales practices.
18
  A private action to enforce DTPA violations in 
Wisconsin has been around since 1969.
19
  The DTPA‘s remedy is to 
compensate injured parties for all pecuniary losses caused by a violation of its 
 
15. See Jean Braucher, Deception, Economic Loss, and Mass-Market Consumers: Consumer 
Protection Statutes as Persuasive Authority in the Common Law of Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 830 
(2006); Marshall A. Leaffer & Michael H. Lipson, Consumer Actions Against Unfair and Deceptive 
Acts or Practices: The Private Uses of Federal Trade Commission Jurisprudence, 48 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 521, 530–32 (1980); Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of 
Consumer Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 15–17 (2005); Mark R. Hinkston, Protecting 
Consumers in the Modern Age: Wisconsin’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act, WIS. LAW., Oct. 2008, at 
14, 16. 
16. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 15, at 7 (discussing drawbacks of common law 
remedies for unfair or deceptive business practices). 
17. See Braucher, supra note 15, at 831. 
18. See id. at 830–31; Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 15, at 32. 
19. James D. Jeffries, Protection for Consumers Against Unfair and Deceptive Business 
Practices in Wisconsin, 57 MARQ. L. REV. 559, 567–68 (1974). 
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provisions while shifting the expense of litigation—attorney‘s fees and 
costs—to the alleged violator.20  The result is that actions for losses based on a 
DTPA violation not only make it easier for aggrieved parties to win, but also 
more rewarding.
21
  For this reason, the DTPA serves as Wisconsin‘s primary 
protection against unfair and deceptive trade practices.
22
 
Distilling the Wisconsin statute‘s language to its operative terms shows 
that it creates a broad negative duty: 
No person . . . shall . . . place before the public . . . an 
advertisement, announcement, statement or representation of 
any kind . . . relating to [the] purchase, sale, hire, use or lease 
of . . . real estate, merchandise, securities, service or 
employment . . . which . . . contains any assertion . . . of fact 
which is untrue, deceptive or misleading.
23
 
The DTPA is interpreted to apply generally whether the prohibited statement 
is made in public or private, so long as no ―particular relationship‖ exists 
between the parties at issue.
24
  The elements of a DTPA violation are (1) the 
defendant made a representation to ―the public‖; (2) the representation was 
untrue, deceptive, or misleading; and (3) the representation caused the 
plaintiff pecuniary loss.
25
  With respect to the first element, a representation to 
the public includes representations made during face-to-face negotiations to 
one person in private.
26
  The public may include consumers or sophisticated 
 
20. WIS. STAT. § 100.18(11)(b)(2) (2007–2008). 
21. See generally Stuart Macaulay, Bambi Meets Godzilla: Reflections on Contracts 
Scholarship and Teaching vs. State Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection 
Statutes, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 575, 599 (1989) (describing the pro-plaintiff, pro-damages aspect of 
DTPA statutes and their interrelationship with contract law). 
22. Most jurisdictions rely on so-called ―little FTC Acts‖ to remedy injuries caused by unfair or 
deceptive trade practices, which are technically distinct from Wisconsin‘s DTPA.  Leaffer & Lipson, 
supra note 15, at 530–32; Cullen Goretzke, Comment, The Resurgence of Caveat Emptor: Puffery 
Undermines the Pro-Consumer Trend in Wisconsin’s Misrepresentation Doctrine, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 
171, 191.  Although Wisconsin has also adopted a little FTC Act, WIS. STAT. § 100.20 (2007–2008), 
the majority of private actions for unfair or deceptive business practices in Wisconsin are brought 
under the DTPA, which is worded differently from little FTCs.  Hinkston, supra note 15, at 15–16; 
Jeffries, supra note 19, at 559–60.  Nonetheless, Wisconsin courts‘ construction and use of 
Wisconsin‘s DTPA is remarkably the same as other courts‘ interpretation of little FTCs, despite 
differences in the statutes‘ texts, and the supreme court has relied on interpretations of the federal 
FTC Act and as well as little FTC Acts.  See Goretzke, supra, at 191.  Suffice it to say that the DTPA 
does the heavy lifting in Wisconsin with respect to private actions for deceptive or unfair trade 
practices. 
23. WIS. STAT. § 100.18(1). 
24. Hinkston, supra note 15, at 17, 63 (discussing what constitutes a ―particular relationship‖). 
25. WIS. STAT. § 100.18(1); K & S Tool & Die Corp. v. Perfection Mach. Sales, Inc., 2007 WI 
70, ¶ 19, 301 Wis. 2d 109, 732 N.W.2d 792. 
26. Hinkston, supra note 15, at 16.  
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commercial parties.
27
  The second element is not interpreted to require intent 
to defraud or even knowledge that one‘s representations are untrue or 
misleading
28—it merely requires a volitional act.29  Plus, reasonable reliance 
is not a prima facie element of causation under the third element.
30
  It is 
sufficient that the alleged representation was a ―material inducement‖ or 
cause-in-fact.
31
  One part misrepresentation,
32
 one part promissory estoppel,
33
 
 
27. Id. at 17. 
28. Id. at 65.  
29. Stuart v. Weisflog‘s Showroom Gallery, Inc., 2008 WI 86, ¶ 37, 311 Wis. 2d 492, 753 
N.W.2d 448. 
30. Hinkston, supra note 15, at 64–65; see also K & S Tool & Die Corp., 2007 WI 70, ¶ 35. 
31. See K & S Tool & Die Corp., 2007 WI 70, ¶ 35; WIS. JURY INSTR. CIVIL 2418. 
32. Facts establishing DTPA liability also support a cause of action for misrepresentation.  In 
fact, courts sometimes refer to the DTPA as a statutory misrepresentation action.  Novell v. 
Migliacco, 2008 WI 44, ¶ 1, 309 Wis. 2d 132, 749 N.W.2d 544.  Wisconsin recognizes three 
different misrepresentation torts: intentional, negligent, and strict liability misrepresentation.  
Ollerman v. O‘Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 25, 288 N.W.2d 95, 99 (1980).  The elements shared by 
all three theories are nearly identical to those needed to establish a DTPA claim.  These 
misrepresentation torts at least require that: ―(1) [t]he representation must be of a fact and made by 
the defendant; (2) the representation of fact must be untrue; and (3) the plaintiff must believe such 
representation to be true and rely thereon to his damage.‖  Id. (quoting Whipp v. Iverson, 43 Wis. 2d 
166, 169–70, 168 N.W.2d 201, 203–04 (1969)).  However, the difference between the DTPA and 
misrepresentation is that a showing of knowledge, bad faith, or intent to induce or defraud is not an 
element of misrepresentation.  See Hinkston, supra note 15, at 65; K & S Tool & Die Corp., 2007 WI 
70, ¶ 19 n.6.  Indeed, it is true that legislatures enacting statutes such as the DTPA intentionally 
omitted many of the elements needed to establish common law misrepresentation for the purpose of 
removing these substantive barriers to relief.  See Braucher, supra note 15, at 831; Hinkston, supra 
note 15, at 16; Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 15, at 15.  The DTPA has a heightened advantage 
over misrepresentation claims because the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that, under the economic 
loss doctrine, contracting parties injured by misrepresentations must resort to contract remedies 
exclusively because ―misrepresentations . . . that ultimately concern the quality of the product sold, 
are properly remedied through claims for breach of warranty.‖  Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 
2004 WI 32, ¶ 30, 270 Wis. 2d 146, 677 N.W.2d 253 (quoting Cooper Power Sys., Inc. v. Union 
Carbide Chems. & Plastics Co., 123 F.3d 675, 682 (7th Cir. 1997)); Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg 
Sales Co., 2005 WI 11, ¶ 42, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d 205.  However, the same reasoning does 
not apply to DTPA claims, even though their elements are comparable to those in common law 
misrepresentation claims.  Kailin v. Armstrong, 2002 WI App 70, ¶¶ 40, 42, 252 Wis. 2d 676, 643 
N.W.2d 132.  This is because the supreme court held that the economic loss doctrine does not apply 
to statutory claims such as the DTPA.  See infra note 65 and accompanying text.  The result is that a 
good deal of the substance behind promissory liability in tort lives on in the DTPA, which is why it is 
common for aggrieved parties to assert DTPA claims in the absence of tort remedies otherwise 
precluded by the economic loss doctrine.  See, e.g., Anderson L. Cao et al., Recent Developments in 
Business Litigation, 43 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 299, 310 (2008) (stating that ―[a] common 
way to attempt recovery of tort remedies and avoid application of [the economic loss doctrine] is to 
assert a deceptive trade practices claim‖). 
33. Both theories exist for purposes of imposing promissory liability out of representations that 
induce reliance and harm without necessitating proof of intent or deceit.  See K & S Tool & Die 
Corp., 2007 WI 70, ¶ 19 n.6 (clarifying that intent is not an element of a DTPA violation); 
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 26 Wis. 2d 683, 694–95, 133 N.W.2d 267, 272–73 (describing 
promissory estoppel as a remedy for unfulfilled promises without evidence of fraud or bad faith); 
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and one part express warranty,
34
 the DTPA supplies a distinct, catchall 
statutory cause of action.
35
  And because there is no intent, knowledge, bad 
faith, or reliance requirement, the DTPA casts a long, strict liability shadow 
over representations made in the transactional setting.
36
 
Observers of DTPA-type statutes have noted how they operate in practice 
to override the formalism of contract law.
37
  The breakdown in contract 
formalism—due mostly to the relaxed substantive requirements needed to 
prove a DTPA-type claim—allows courts to ignore contract terms to correct 
deceptive or misleading behavior.
38
  Further, by way of the DTPA‘s distinct 
 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932); Stanley D. Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and 
Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343, 358 (1969) (stating that ―the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel imposes liability without regard to expressed intention‖).  In other words, one 
could argue that the DTPA is similar to promissory estoppel in that both are predicated on something 
that amounts to a representation that a fact exists, which in turn causes another to act upon that 
representation of fact to her detriment.  3 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, POMEROY‘S EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE § 808(b) (5th ed. 1941) (describing the core principles of promissory estoppel as it 
relates to equitable doctrines).  It should be noted too that Wisconsin courts are not strangers to DTPA 
claims brought in the promissory estoppel context.  See generally N. Am. Mech., Inc. v. Diocese of 
Madison, No. 98-3251, 1999 WL 516803 (Wis. Ct. App. July 22, 1999) (plaintiff asserting DTPA 
claim in conjunction with promissory estoppel); Bundy v. Univ. of Wis.-Eau Claire, No. 97-2735, 
1998 WL 265042 (Wis. Ct. App. May 27, 1998) (same). 
34. Promissory liability under the DTPA also attaches in the breach of warranty context.  See, 
e.g., Below v. Norton, 2008 WI 77, ¶¶ 25, 42, 310 Wis. 2d 713, 751 N.W.2d 351 (permitting the 
plaintiff to proceed on a DTPA action where the seller of residential real estate breached the warranty 
in the sales contract).  The DTPA, like warranty law, triggers accountability for the veracity of an 
assertion, representation, or statement of fact.  ―A ‗warranty‘ is an assurance by one party to a contract 
of the existence of a fact upon which the other party may rely.  It . . . amounts to a promise to 
indemnify the promisee for any loss if the fact warranted proves untrue.‖  Dittman v. Nagel, 43 
Wis. 2d 155, 160, 168 N.W.2d 190, 193 (1969) (quoting 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 342 (1963)).  Under 
both warranty law and the DTPA, liability arises where a product fails to conform to a promise or 
affirmation of fact that induced its purchase; for example, where the product purchased is of quality 
inferior to that represented by the seller.  Consequently, it is not uncommon for a DTPA claim to arise 
from the same facts creating a cause of action for breach of warranty.  See 3 PHILIP L. BRUNER & 
PATRICK J. O‘CONNOR, JR., BRUNER & O‘CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 9:9 (2002); Donald F. 
Clifford, Jr., Non-UCC Statutory Provisions Affecting Warranty Disclaimers and Remedies in Sales of 
Goods, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1011, 1098–99 (1993) (observing that DTPA and similar consumer protection 
statutes sound like warranty claims—where the nature or quality of the goods is other than that 
represented by the seller); G. Richard Shell, Substituting Ethical Standards for Common Law Rules in 
Commercial Cases: An Emerging Statutory Trend, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 1198, 1224 (1988).  
35. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 15, at 32. 
36. In dicta, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has also expressed agreement that the DTPA is a 
strict liability statute.  K & S Tool & Die Corp., 2007 WI 70, ¶ 19 n.6 (stating that intent to induce an 
obligation is not an element of a DTPA claim); see also Van Lare v. Vogt, Inc., 2004 WI 110, ¶ 23, 
274 Wis. 2d 631, 683 N.W.2d 46 (alleging facts that gave rise to common law strict liability 
misrepresentation and a DTPA violation); Grube v. Daun, 173 Wis. 2d 30, 52–63, 496 N.W.2d 106, 
113–18 (Ct. App. 1992) (same facts that gave rise to common law strict liability misrepresentation 
also gave rise to a DTPA violation).  The Seventh Circuit has likewise interpreted Wisconsin‘s 
DTPA as such.  Eberts v. Goderstad, 569 F.3d 757, 763 (7th Cir. 2009) (applying Wisconsin law).  
37. See Shell, supra note 34, at 1202. 
38. Id. at 1235. 
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elements and statutory nature, courts have permitted DTPA plaintiffs to tread 
on contract ground where tort claims are otherwise barred.
39
  Because of these 
attributes, the DTPA and others like it are susceptible to a construction that 
enables a replacement theory of obligation—one based on standards of 
honesty and fairness, and not mechanized common law doctrine.
40
  Wisconsin 
courts agree that the DTPA is distinct from common law claims
41
 but also that 
it applies in breach of contract situations.
42
  However, prior to K & S, the 
supreme court had not addressed whether a DTPA claim for breach of 
contract was grounds to disregard contract terms.  In fact, the court of appeals 
had decided the question negatively, holding that an integration clause is 
enforceable against DTPA claims.
43
  This is why K & S, a case in which the 
supreme court ignored a forum selection clause to impose DTPA liability as a 
matter of law, is pregnant with important implications for Wisconsin law. 
B.  K & S and DTPA Liability for Breach of Contract as a Matter of Law 
In early 2000, John Deere approached a Wisconsin manufacturer, K & S 
Tool and Die Corporation (K & S), to produce a part for its riding 
lawnmowers.
44
  The process for producing the part was such that K & S had 
to buy new equipment—a 1,000-ton press.45  It contacted Perfection 
Machinery Sales, Inc. (Perfection), an Illinois-based dealer in used heavy 
equipment, to find the press.
46
  Perfection had no such presses in stock but 
nonetheless agreed to find one for K & S.  Perfection sent K & S two 
machines that it represented in a sales quotation were 1,000-ton presses.
47
  
K & S had the equipment professionally inspected, and being satisfied with 
this inspection, ultimately contracted with Perfection to purchase one of the 
 
39. See supra note 32. 
40. Shell, supra note 34, at 1202, 1222, 1235–36. 
41. See infra note 65 and accompanying text. 
42. In Van Lare v. Vogt, Inc., which was handed down three years prior to K & S, the supreme 
court explained in dicta that a seller‘s breach of a commercial real estate sales contract created 
liability under contract law and the DTPA, and that recovery could be had under both.  2004 WI 110, 
¶ 23, 274 Wis. 2d 631, 683 N.W.2d 46.  Later, in Below v. Norton, the court relied on K & S to 
support the proposition that a remedy for breach of contract could be had under contract law or the 
DTPA.  2008 WI 77, ¶ 42, 310 Wis. 2d 713, 751 N.W.2d 351.  Though the economic loss doctrine 
precluded misrepresentation claims under the same circumstances, the court explained, aggrieved 
purchasers still have adequate remedies under contract law and the DTPA.  Id., ¶ 38. 
43. Peterson v. Cornerstone Prop. Dev., LLC, 2006 WI App 132, ¶ 30, 294 Wis. 2d 800, 720 
N.W.2d 716. 
44. K & S Tool & Die Corp. v. Perfection Mach. Sales, Inc., 2007 WI 70, ¶ 4, 301 Wis. 2d 109, 
732 N.W.2d 792. 
45. Id., ¶ 5. 
46. Id., ¶ 6. 
47. Id., ¶¶ 8–9. 
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offered machines for $225,000.
48
  K & S later discovered that the press it had 
purchased was a 1,000-ton press remanufactured to press with only 800 tons 
of force, instead of the represented 1,000 tons.
49
  The purchase agreement 
contained a forum selection clause that would have placed K & S in an Illinois 
state court, Perfection‘s home forum.50  K & S nonetheless sued Perfection in 
Wisconsin solely for a violation of the DTPA.
51
  After a jury trial, the trial 
court entered judgment on the jury verdict against Perfection, awarding K & S 
$306,000 in damages.
52
  On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the judgment 
and held that no error had occurred in applying the DTPA to impose liability 
on Perfection for the sale.
53
 
As innocuous as the court‘s conclusion in K & S may seem, it hides 
perhaps a groundbreaking discovery in Wisconsin‘s contract jurisprudence.  
Perfection contracted with K & S to provide a 1,000-ton press.  One assumes, 
for the sake of discussion, that the parties‘ contract was supported by 
consideration and otherwise enforceable by itself.  But for the DTPA, one 
could assume further that K & S would have been forced to base its claim on 
the contract and, consequently, litigate in Perfection‘s home court in Illinois.  
However, the absence of any substantive discussion in the court‘s opinion 
concerning the contract terms, warranties, or its overall effect on K & S‘s 
recovery from Perfection shows that the contract was entirely unnecessary as 
a condition for imposing liability.  Instead, the court applied DTPA liability to 
Perfection‘s breach as a matter of law.  In fact, the only mention of the 
parties‘ contract in the court‘s opinion was in regard to its evidentiary 
function.
54
  Because the DTPA provided an independent basis for Perfection‘s 
liability, the parties‘ contract, and therefore the forum selection clause, had no 
bearing on K & S‘s recovery.  In other words, it appears as though K & S sets 
precedent for parties to avoid unfavorable contract terms in contract disputes 
simply by asserting a DTPA claim for what is in essence a breach of 
contract.
55
 
The K & S decision can be viewed as only the latest development in a 
longtime tug of war in Wisconsin law over the distinction between contract 
 
48. Id. 
49. Id., ¶ 10. 
50. See K & S Tool & Die Corp. v. Perfection Mach. Sales, Inc., 2006 WI App 148, ¶ 7 n.3, 
295 Wis. 2d 298, 720 N.W.2d 507. 
51. K & S Tool & Die Corp., 2007 WI 70, ¶ 1, 301 Wis. 2d 109, 732 N.W.2d 792. 
52. Id., ¶ 14. 
53. Id., ¶ 2. 
54. Id., ¶ 40 (explaining that testimony was had on the contract‘s terms in an attempt to 
disprove the reliance element). 
55. See Shell, supra note 34, at 1235. 
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and other law.
56
  The court has explained on many occasions that contract law 
serves to effectuate exchanges by protecting the benefit of the bargain, and it 
is therefore distinct from other law.
57
  But there are times when a breach of 
contract case presents itself in such a way that a plaintiff can choose to 
disguise his contract claim under other law as a matter of strategic advantage.  
Certainly, whether under statutory or tort law, the strategic advantages in 
litigating a breach under other law are many.  It may be that the statute of 
limitations on a contract claim has expired while the discovery rule permits a 
tort claim.
58
  Further, it may be that a litigant‘s choice is motivated by a 
disparity between the damages available in contract compared to other law.
59
  
A classic example of this disparity is where the aggrieved purchaser incurs 
lost profits and other consequential damages, but the contract at issue limits 
the remedy for breach to repair and replacement.
60
  Another instance where it 
would be beneficial to avoid contract law would be where the contract at issue 
is void under the statute of frauds.  One could avoid such contractual obstacles 
by attempting to base a breach of contract claim on other theories not 
similarly impaired, such as negligence or misrepresentation.
61
  Another 
example is that plaintiffs who successfully litigate breach of contract as a 
DTPA violation may recover attorney‘s fees and costs whereas the default 
contract rule is the American rule—parties pay their own way.62  These and 
 
56. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 225 Wis. 2d 305, 318–21, 592 
N.W.2d 201, 206–08 (1999) (describing the historical struggle to find an appropriate boundary 
between tort and contract law). 
57. Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 216 Wis. 2d 395, 404–05, 573 N.W.2d 842, 
846–47 (1999). 
58. See, e.g., Van Lare v. Vogt, Inc., 2004 WI 110, ¶ 23, 274 Wis. 2d 631, 683 N.W.2d 46 
(describing how a purchaser of commercial real estate sued on a strict liability misrepresentation 
theory where the statute of limitations had expired on contract and DTPA claims). 
59. See Shell, supra note 34, at 1224–25.  The K & S case is a good example of this strategy.  
The contract price of the equipment in K & S was $225,000.  K & S Tool & Die Corp., 2007 WI 70, 
¶ 8.  However, by asserting a DTPA claim instead of breach of contract, K & S wound up pocketing 
$306,000, not including its attorney‘s fees.  Id., ¶ 14. 
60. See, e.g., Sunnyslope Grading Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 910, 
914, 437 N.W.2d 213, 214 (1989). 
61. In Sunnyslope Grading, Inc., a commercial purchaser of excavation equipment bought 
machines under a manufacturer‘s limited warranty, which limited remedies for breach of warranty to 
repair or replacement and disclaimed liability for consequential damages.  Id. at 913–14, 437 N.W.2d 
at 214.  When the machines broke down, the purchaser attempted to avoid this contractual limitation 
by asserting a negligence claim.  Id. at 911–12, 437 N.W.2d at 213.  The supreme court held that 
contract law prohibits a ―commercial purchaser of a product‖ from recovering economic losses from 
a manufacturer in tort ―where the warranty given by the manufacturer specifically precludes recovery 
for such damages.‖  Id. at 921, 437 N.W.2d at 218.  
62. See Shell, supra note 34, at 1248–49 (explaining that attorney‘s fees create a lopsided 
incentive for aggrieved purchasers to litigate breaches under DTPA statutes); see also Ly v. 
Norstrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 313–14 (Minn. 2000) (observing the unwarranted strategic advantage in 
recovering for ordinary breach of contract under Minnesota‘s DTPA due to its fee-shifting 
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other considerations serve to underscore the strategic advantages of litigating 
contract disputes under other, non-contract law. 
K & S is only the latest in a series of clever attempts to end-run 
unfavorable but otherwise enforceable contract terms by litigating breach of 
contract claims under other law, and in particular, it is an exemplar of the 
strategic advantage in using Wisconsin‘s DTPA to this end.  It shows that, in 
order to avoid a legitimate, enforceable contract term in an action for breach, 
one need only assert a DTPA claim.  That K & S could avoid the Illinois 
courts and still recover all its losses, attorney‘s fees, and costs in Wisconsin 
just by recasting its claim for breach as a DTPA violation was no doubt a 
strong consideration in developing the theory of its case.  But there is a 
history to the K & S strategy that extends beyond the case‘s procedural 
posture.  As mentioned before, parties have been asserting tort claims to 
recover for breach of contract for years,
63
 and the K & S strategy is basically 
the same old chestnut.  The difference is that Wisconsin courts have adopted a 
strong economic loss doctrine to preclude this strategy where torts are 
concerned.
64
  But it is clear that those same jurisprudential constraints are 
inapplicable to statutory claims such as the DTPA, which means contracts are 
particularly susceptible to disingenuous claims now more than ever because of 
the K & S decision.
65
 
III.  IMPLICATIONS 
K & S establishes that claims under Wisconsin‘s DTPA are a robust 
alternative to contract remedies, and given the pro-plaintiff advantages 
inherent in the DTPA, it would be fair to conclude that everyday breaches will 
be litigated under the statute with increasing frequency.  What are the 
implications of this trend?  K & S arguably sets a precedent for courts to 
ignore contract terms and impose DTPA liability for breach as a matter of 
 
provisions). 
63. See, e.g., A. E. Inv. Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 483, 214 N.W.2d 764, 766 
(1974) (allowing tort recovery for a negligently performed service contract). 
64. See John L. Laubmeier, Demystifying Wisconsin’s Economic Loss Doctrine, 2005 WIS. L. 
REV. 225, 233–34 (explaining how the strategy of asserting a tort claim for breach of contract would 
avert the parties‘ contract terms and the U.C.C., and how the economic loss doctrine is designed to 
preclude that result). 
65. The reason being that courts have articulated a statutory claim exception to the economic 
loss doctrine.  In Kailin v. Armstrong, purchasers of commercial real estate (the Kailins) sued their 
seller (Armstrong) for breach of contract, misrepresentation, and DTPA violations.  2002 WI App 70, 
¶ 1, 252 Wis. 2d 676, 643 N.W.2d 132.  The defendant asserted the economic loss doctrine as an 
affirmative defense to the misrepresentation and DTPA claims.  Id., ¶ 12.  The court of appeals 
disagreed, holding that the DTPA created a distinct cause of action immune from the economic loss 
doctrine.  Id., ¶ 43.  The supreme court subsequently adopted the reasoning in Kailin, exempting 
statutory claims in general from the economic loss doctrine.  Stuart v. Weisflog‘s Showroom Gallery, 
Inc., 2008 WI 22, ¶¶ 35–37, 308 Wis. 2d 103, 746 N.W.2d 762. 
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law.  Although the term ignored in K & S was a forum selection clause, it 
could follow from this approach that courts may also set aside terms that 
allocate economic risk—such as warranty disclaimers, limited warranties, 
indemnification clauses, or remedy modifications—to give effect to the DTPA 
remedy.  This approach would basically allocate all the risk of loss to one 
party—the seller. 
A fundamental principle of Wisconsin law is that only contracting parties 
bear the economic risks of contracting.
66
  Where personal injury or property 
damage is concerned, society has developed a way to bear the brunt of these 
hazards through liability insurance.
67
  However, a lack of adequate liability 
insurance for purely economic losses caused by breach of contract makes 
breach a difficult injury to insure against through the normal channels.
68
  
Contracting parties must therefore ascertain their own economic risks and 
allocate those risks among each other accordingly—they must become self-
insured.
69
  For this reason, warranties and other contractual risk-allocating 
devices play a critical role in controlling parties‘ exposure to economic loss.  
They function as insurance policies built into the contract terms. 
A warranty is a particular type of promise whereby the warrantor promises 
to answer for damages when a certain set of facts is found not to exist—it is, 
in effect, an insurance policy.
70
  Professor Corbin equated the creation of a 
warranty with a promise to indemnify against loss in case the facts turn out 
not to be as represented.
71
  Judge Learned Hand likewise characterized a 
warranty as a ―promise to indemnify.‖72  Wisconsin also recognizes that the 
 
66. CLL Associates Ltd. P‘ship v. Arrowhead Pac. Corp., 174 Wis. 2d 604, 611, 497 N.W.2d 
115, 118 (1993). 
67. JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 7–10 (7th ed. 1987). 
68. CLL Associates, 174 Wis. 2d at 611–12, 497 N.W.2d at 118; Note, Economic Loss in 
Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 917, 954–55 (1966) (discussing the 
insurability of economic losses compared to personal injury); see generally Ellen S. Pryor, The 
Economic Loss Rule and Liability Insurance, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 905 (2006) (discussing the 
opportunities or a lack thereof in obtaining commercial liability insurance for economic losses).  
However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has found that ―contractually-assumed liability‖ exclusions 
in commercial general liability policies do not per se exclude coverage for all breaches, which 
partially alleviates these problems.  See Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶ 8, 
268 Wis. 2d 16, 673 N.W.2d 65.  
69. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 225 Wis. 2d 305, 327–33, 592 
N.W.2d 201, 210–12 (1999); Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 216 Wis. 2d 395, 407–10, 
573 N.W.2d 842, 847–849 (1998); CLL Associates, 174 Wis. 2d at 611–12, 497 N.W.2d at 118. 
70. See SMS Sys. Maint. Servs., Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 188 F.3d 11, 14 (1st Cir. 1999); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 cmt. d (1981); 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 342 (1999). 
71. 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.14 (rev. ed. 1993).  But see 
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES 210 (1930).  Professor 
Llewellyn, the principal draftsman of the U.C.C., detested warranties and, ironically, apparently 
desired to ignore the concept of warranty altogether. 
72. Metro. Coal Co. v. Howard, 155 F.2d 780, 784 (2d Cir. 1946); see Glenn D. West &  
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effect of a warranty is to indemnify a purchaser as to the warranty‘s subject 
matter.
73
  Accepting the comparison as accurate, the promise to indemnify and 
its scope is a critical contract term.
74
  Depending on the parties and the nature 
of the transaction, warranties can range from very sophisticated to simple and 
straightforward arrangements.
75
  On one hand, an individual selling a used 
boat on Craigslist.com might require the sale to be ―as is‖—no warranties—
and the buyer may agree in exchange for a lower price.  On the other hand, a 
sophisticated businessperson acquiring a going concern may require enhanced 
coverage—perhaps an extended warranty with an escrow agreement—and the 
seller may require a higher purchase price or a ―basket‖ in return to account 
for its increased risk.
76
  In any event, courts presume that parties factor risk 
allocation into their agreements and that the contract price accurately reflects 
the amount of built-in warranty coverage.
77
  But because K & S likely gives 
courts the authority to strip away contract terms in applying the DTPA, 
parties‘ ability to effectively allocate risk by contract will diminish 
significantly.
78
 
Without the freedom to effectively allocate risk by contract, such as with 
warranties, the costs of transacting business become incredibly unpredictable 
and expensive.  One can find a drastic example of this problem in a Fifth 
Circuit case applying Texas‘s DTPA to a commercial contract dispute.79  In 
 
W. Benton Lewis, Jr., Contracting to Avoid Extra-Contractual Liability—Can Your Contractual 
Deal Ever Really Be the “Entire” Deal?, 64 BUS. LAW. 999, 1020 (2009). 
73. Dittman v. Nagel, 43 Wis. 2d 155, 160, 168 N.W.2d 190, 193 (1969) (quoting 17A C.J.S. 
Contracts § 342 (1963)). 
74. The exception to this rule is products liability theory—where breach of warranty results in 
personal injury or property damage.  See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 225 Wis. 2d at 316, 592 
N.W.2d at 205. 
75. See West & Lewis, supra note 72, at 1020–21. 
76. Id. 
77. See Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 216 Wis. 2d 395, 408, 573 N.W.2d 842, 
848 (1998) (quoting Stoughton Trailers, Inc. v. Henkel Corp., 965 F. Supp. 1227, 1230 (W.D. Wis. 
1997)) (presuming commercial parties bargain for contractual promises, specifically warranties); 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 225 Wis. 2d at 327–28, 592 N.W.2d at 210 (applying the same 
presumption to consumer transactions).  There are, however, strong opposing views on this 
presumption.  Professor Slawson argued that ―[t]he contracting still imagined by courts and law 
teachers as typical, in which both parties participate in choosing the language of their entire 
agreement, is no longer of much more than historical importance‖ and that the complexity of modern 
life and law have made form contracts the preferred method of contracting.  W. David Slawson, 
Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Law Making Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 
529–31 (1971).  Specifically, with respect to the presumption that parties allocate risk, it has been 
argued that this presumption is false and that incomplete contracting is the norm.  See Subha 
Narasimhan, Of Expectations, Incomplete Contracting, and the Bargain Principle, 74 CAL. L. REV. 
1123, 1129–30 (1986). 
78. See Note, supra note 68, at 965–66 (explaining that holding manufacturers liable for 
economic losses outside of contract would essentially force them to fully insure their products). 
79. Int‘l Nickel Co. v. Trammel Crow Distrib. Corp., 803 F.2d 150, 151–52 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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International Nickel Co. v. Trammel Crow Distribution Corp., the plaintiff 
contracted with a warehouse to store 71,000 pounds of nickel.
80
  The 
warehouse failed to deliver the nickel back to the plaintiff on time, which led 
to damages and a lawsuit.
81
  The plaintiff‘s contract with the warehouse 
contained a liability limitation that essentially limited the defendant‘s liability 
to $11,491, a provision that the trial court ultimately enforced.
82
  However, on 
appeal, the court found that by asserting a DTPA claim under the Texas 
statute, the plaintiff was able to override the contractual liability limitation to 
recover the full value of its nickel––$216,000—plus attorney‘s fees.83  That is 
nearly eighteen times more liability than the defendant warehouse had agreed 
to assume in the contract. 
There are several problems that could conceivably result from a regime 
such as this where courts may ignore contract terms in evaluating a DTPA 
claim.  One problem is the potential for moral hazard.  Moral hazard is the 
―tendency of an insured to relax his efforts to prevent the occurrence of the risk 
that he has insured against because he has shifted the risk to an [insurer].‖84  
Moral hazard creates inefficiency and waste because the incentive for an 
insured buyer to take care in making contract decisions is decreased and the 
seller‘s costs of providing warranty coverage increase with the attendant rise in 
claims.
85
  If it were understood that under the DTPA a seller is always liable 
for the quality of her performance notwithstanding the contract, what incentive 
would purchasers have in investigating a product‘s quality themselves or, 
alternatively, purchasing a warranty?  It would seem that the seller would 
always bear the risk of loss and, consequently, purchasers would have little 
motivation to avoid ―poor purchasing‖ by protecting themselves before and 
after contracting for a product or service.
86
  The potential for moral hazard is 
further increased by the fact that the opportunity costs for buyers to litigate 
contract claims under the DTPA, as opposed to contract law, are relatively low 
due to the availability of attorney‘s fees and costs.87 
Another problem is how contracting parties—particularly sellers—should 
go about absorbing the increased risk of liability for breach under the DTPA.  It 
 
80. Id. at 151–52. 
81. Id. at 152. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 155. 
84. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 109 (6th ed. 2003) 
85. See Thomas J. Holdych & Bruce D. Mann, The Basis of the Bargain Requirement: A 
Market and Economic Based Analysis of Express Warranties—Getting What You Pay for and Paying 
for What You Get, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 781, 798 (1996). 
86. William Breit & Kenneth G. Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement and Economic Efficiency: The 
Uneasy Case for Treble Damages, 17 J.L. & ECON. 329, 339 (1974).  
87. See Holdych & Mann, supra note 85, at 798–99. 
2010] BEYOND DECEPTION 1171 
would appear that, under Wisconsin law, DTPA liability for pure breach of 
contract cannot be allocated by contract or insured under a commercial general 
liability (CGL) policy.  Again, K & S sets the stage for courts to strip apart 
contract terms and impose DTPA liability as a matter of law without respect to 
the parties‘ contractual allocations of risk.  Further, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court in Stuart v. Weisflog’s Showroom Gallery, Inc. II (Stuart II) interpreted 
the term ―occurrence,‖ defined as an ―accident‖ in CGL policies, to exclude 
statutory violations that require proof of volitional acts.
88
  With reference to the 
DTPA, the court explained in dicta that the DTPA is such a statute and 
therefore outside normal CGL coverage.
89
  The Seventh Circuit, applying 
Stuart II, has also precluded CGL coverage for DTPA violations.
90
  Thus, 
without the traditional means to protect themselves—contract or liability 
insurance—sellers are exposed to significantly higher risks posed by the DTPA. 
The lack of adequate liability insurance for economic losses and the 
inability to allocate risk by contract, it would seem, leaves sellers with limited 
options: (1) do nothing and suffer forced withdrawal from the marketplace;  
(2) close shop and make a voluntary withdrawal from the marketplace;  
(3) continue to sell albeit without marketing operations; or (4) increase prices 
to reflect the increased risk.  The first option would occur in instances where 
sellers neglect to change their normal business practices—e.g., marketing and 
selling products—and succumb to overwhelming liability for breach under the 
DTPA, eventually causing the seller to be run out of business.  The second 
would occur where, after assessing the costs and benefits of DTPA liability for 
breach, sellers choose to stop operating in Wisconsin.  The third option would 
require a conscious decision by sellers to continue to sell their products but 
without the benefit of communicating about their product‘s quality, fitness, or 
specifications, and thereby avoid liability for representations made with ―an 
intent to sell‖ under the DTPA.  Given the undesirability and improbability of 
options one through three, it seems obvious that sellers will be forced to 
increase the purchase price of their goods or services to absorb the increased 
risks of contracting in Wisconsin.  In essence, such an increase would reflect 
an ―insurance premium,‖ which would in theory allow the seller to pool its 
own resources to cover the anticipated rise in losses created by DTPA 
liability.
91
 
The argument for imposing DTPA liability as a matter of law irrespective 
of contract is that it permits courts to strip away contract terms behind which 
 
88. 2008 WI 86, ¶¶ 30–36, 45, 311 Wis. 2d 492, 753 N.W.2d 448. 
89. Id., ¶¶ 35, 37. 
90. Eberts v. Goderstad, 569 F.3d 757, 763 (7th Cir. 2009). 
91. See Note, supra note 68, at 952–53. 
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unscrupulous dealers hide dishonesty and deceit.
92
  Where dishonesty and 
deceit exist, this course of action is obviously justified.  However, extending 
this approach beyond deceptive or unfair circumstances to ordinary breach 
situations only deters efficient, prudent, and otherwise desirable contracting 
practices.  Remedying ordinary breach of contract with DTPA remedies is bad 
policy for this reason.  DTPA liability for breach reverses the rule that parties 
must bear their own risk; it creates a perverse incentive for parties not to be 
diligent or careful in their economic relations.  In sum, ignoring contract terms, 
though justified in some instances, has little to no utility where ordinary breach 
of contract is concerned and, arguably, the practice does not at all further the 
DTPA‘s purpose.  When courts strip away contract terms where a DTPA claim 
is asserted, it is patently unfair to the institution of contracts upon which our 
economy is built and to those who use them in a lawful, prudent way. 
IV.  PRUDENTIAL BOUNDARIES: THE ―MERE BREACH‖ RULE AND DTPA 
VERSUS THE U.C.C. 
In light of the implications described above, Wisconsin courts that decide 
to follow plaintiffs down the DTPA path should first consider two major 
issues.  First, courts must affirmatively decide if there is a genuine difference 
between garden-variety breach of contract claims and DTPA violations as a 
matter of law.  Depending on one‘s point of view, resolution of this question 
could be viewed as an unwarranted hindrance to realizing the DTPA‘s full 
potential
93
 or, conversely, as a justifiable defense of the institution of contracts 
and legitimate profit-seeking activity.
94
  Either way, resolution will 
significantly help clarify the law governing commercial exchanges, which is 
in and of itself an important goal.  Courts discerning the difference between 
breach and a DTPA violation have categorized their findings under the 
heading of a ―mere breach‖ rule.  The three approaches to the mere breach 
rule are discussed below.  Second, conflict between the DTPA and the U.C.C. 
is an inevitable consequence of applying the DTPA to contract disputes.  
Again, depending on one‘s point of view, resolution of this issue could be 
construed as a hindrance or help, but resolution is absolutely necessary before 
proceeding further down the DTPA path. 
A.  The “Mere Breach” Rule 
The United States Supreme Court has explained that ―the basis for a 
contract action is the parties‘ agreement; to succeed under consumer 
protection law, one must show not necessarily an agreement, but in all cases, 
 
92. Shell, supra note 34, at 1235–36. 
93. Id. at 1236 (decrying the mere breach rule as unduly restricting the DTPA‘s potential). 
94. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 15, at 49, 66 (supporting efforts to limit the DTPA‘s 
scope). 
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an unfair or deceptive practice.‖95  This statement best captures the majority 
approach to the conflict between contracts and DTPA-type statutes, which is 
the mere breach rule.  The mere breach rule simply holds that a mere breach 
of contract, without more, cannot constitute a violation of DTPA-type statutes 
as a matter of law.
96
  Indeed, there is a fundamental difference between 
broken contractual promises and deception or misrepresentation.
97
  Deceptive 
acts, the reasoning goes, require something more than the mere fact that the 
defendant promised to do something and then failed to do it because ―that 
type of ‗misrepresentation‘ occurs every time a defendant breaches a 
contract.‖98  To characterize mere breaches, even intentional ones, as 
deceptive acts would mean DTPA-type statutes apply to virtually all contract 
disputes, supplying aggrieved parties with an additional, redundant remedy.
99
  
Given the implications of this result, courts have found that legislatures did 
not intend DTPA-type statutes to be construed so broadly.
100
 
Although there seems to be consensus among other jurisdictions on the 
mere breach rule, the concept remains largely unaddressed in Wisconsin 
law.
101
  To be sure, Wisconsin courts have attached to the DTPA a distinction 
between it and the common law such that the DTPA is not just an add-on to 
existing common law remedies.
102
  It has followed from this interpretation that 
 
95. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 233 (1995). 
96. Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801, 844 (Ill. 2005); Ashford Dev., 
Inc. v. USLife Real Estate Servs. Corp., 661 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Tex. 1983).  The same can be said for 
mere breach of warranty, see Searles v. Fleetwood Homes of Pa., Inc., 2005 ME 94, ¶ 34, 878 A.2d 
509, but for simplicity‘s sake, the mere breach rule for contracts and warranties is subsumed into one 
discussion here. 
97. Rhino Linings USA, Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Rhino Lining, Inc., 62 P.3d 142, 148 (Colo. 
2003).  A promise can be a misrepresentation if, at the time it is made, the promisor had no intention 
of performing it—that is an intentional tort.  Id. (citation omitted).  However, a promise bargained for 
in exchange for a return promise or performance is simply a contract.  Id.  Therefore, absent the 
requisite intent, the mere failure to perform a bargained-for promise is a contractual injury.  Id.; 
1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE 
UNIFORM SALES ACT § 12 (2d ed. 1924). 
98. Zankle v. Queen Anne Landscaping, Inc., 724 N.E.2d 988, 993 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). 
99. Avery, 835 N.E.2d at 844 (citation omitted). 
100. See, e.g., id. 
101. The lone exception being an unpublished case wherein the court of appeals affirmed 
summary judgment entered against the plaintiff who had brought contract and DTPA claims.  
Christensen v. TDS Metrocom LLC, No. 08-AP-554, 2008 WL 5172804, ¶ 14 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 
11, 2008).  In Christensen, the plaintiff argued that the failure to perform a contractual obligation as 
represented is a per se misrepresentation under the DTPA.  See id., ¶ 15.  The court rejected that 
argument and held that failure to perform as represented is not, by itself, enough to establish a DTPA 
violation.  See id., ¶¶ 18–19.  The statute, the court explained, took aim at false advertising and 
attendant misrepresentations, not breach of contract, and accepting the plaintiffs‘ argument would 
unreasonably blur a line between the two bodies of law.  Id., ¶ 17. 
102. Peterson v. Cornerstone Prop. Dev., LLC, 2006 WI App 132, ¶ 30, 294 Wis. 2d 800, 720 
N.W.2d 716; see Kailin v. Armstrong, 2002 WI App 70, ¶ 40, 252 Wis. 2d 676, 643 N.W.2d 132. 
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there is an inherent difference between the DTPA and common law remedies 
that, so far, has only served as a basis to enlarge the DTPA‘s application.103  
But there are two sides to every coin, and in this case, the flip side must be the 
mere breach rule.  Indeed, if it is true in Wisconsin that a DTPA action is not 
cumulative of common law remedies and therefore inherently distinct from 
common law claims, then it should have no application where a pure common 
law dispute is at issue, such as in a breach of contract case. 
By expressly adopting the mere breach rule, Wisconsin courts would 
effectively preserve the distinction between contract law and the DTPA, and 
in the process decisively avoid unnecessary entanglements between benign 
contract disputes and truly deceptive acts.  But where does the distinction lie?  
What criteria should courts use to discern it?  While most jurisdictions agree 
on the mere breach rule‘s goal—enforcing a prudential boundary between true 
contract disputes and true DTPA claims—there exists a variety of methods for 
reaching that objective.  Three primary tests have emerged: the public interest 
standard, the ―rascality‖ standard, and the misfeasance standard. 
1.  The Public Interest Standard
104
 
The public interest standard is the most exculpatory of all tests 
promulgated under the mere breach rule.
105
  Although it is claimed to be the 
minority approach, a growing number of jurisdictions have adopted it, 
including Colorado,
106
 Georgia,
107
 Illinois,
108
 Minnesota,
109
 Nebraska,
110
 
New York,
111
 South Carolina,
112
 and Washington.
113
  The rule of the public 
 
103. See Below v. Norton, 2008 WI 77, ¶¶ 6, 37, 310 Wis. 2d 713, 751 N.W.2d 351. 
104. This standard is also referred to as the ―public injury‖ or ―public benefit‖ standard. 
105. See Prentiss Cox, Goliath Has the Slingshot: Public Benefit and Private Enforcement of 
Minnesota Consumer Protection Law, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 163, 207–10, 215–20 (2006) 
(explaining how restrictive the public interest is on DTPA recovery for breach of contract); 
Jonathan A. Mark, Dispensing with the Public Interest Requirement in Private Causes of Action 
Under the Washington Consumer Protection Act, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 205, 234 (2005); Shell, 
supra note 34, at 1235. 
106. Rhino Linings USA, Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Rhino Lining, Inc., 62 P.3d 142, 149 (Colo. 
2003). 
107. Zeeman v. Black, 273 S.E.2d 910, 913–14 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980). 
108. Lake County Grading Co. of Libertyville v. Advance Mech. Contractors, Inc., 654 N.E.2d 
1109, 1116 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).  Although an amendment to the Illinois statute expressly removed 
the public interest element in 1990, Illinois courts have basically continued to apply this standard 
through the ―consumer nexus‖ requirement.  Id.   
109. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 313–14 (Minn. 2000). 
110. Nelson v. Lusterstone Surfacing Co., 605 N.W.2d 136, 141–42 (Neb. 2000). 
111. Oswego Laborers‘ Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 647 N.E.2d 
741, 744 (N.Y. 1995). 
112. Daisy Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Abbott, 473 S.E.2d 47, 50–51 (S.C. 1996). 
113. Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531, 536–37 
(Wash. 1986). 
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interest standard essentially holds that ―if a wrong is private in nature, and 
does not affect the public, a claim is not actionable‖ under consumer 
protection or deceptive trade practice statutes.
114
  In other words, plaintiffs 
must show that the complained-of act or conduct has a broader impact on the 
consuming public at-large, which means that private contract disputes unique 
to the parties generally do not fall within the scope of the DTPA.
115
 
The public interest standard is one implied by the courts based on the 
language and purpose of DTPA-type statutes.
116
  It derives from the view that 
the DTPA and its cognates are intended to protect the general public.  This 
makes sense from an historical standpoint because most of these statutes, 
including Wisconsin‘s, began as public interest statutes; that is, they were 
enforceable only by state agencies.
117
  Later amendments to these statutes 
created ―private attorney general‖ provisions designed to allow private actions 
to enforce DTPA violations.
118
  In light of the private attorney general purpose 
of these private action provisions, courts have interpreted them to apply only 
where the private action seeks to vindicate the public interest, as an actual 
attorney general might, and not merely private rights.
119
  Therefore, the scope 
of private attorney general provisions in deceptive trade practice statutes is no 
broader than that afforded the actual attorney general, who is limited in all 
cases to vindicating the public interest.
120
  But, as a practical matter, the 
purpose of the public interest requirement is to carve ordinary contract disputes 
out of the category of wrongs prohibited by the DTPA and its cognates.
121
 
Jurisdictions that have adopted the public interest standard employ 
different tests for identifying acts or conduct that affect the public interest.  
New York has stuck with an ad hoc approach to determining when an 
ordinary contract claim affects the public interest.
122
  Illinois plaintiffs must 
 
114. Rhino Linings USA, Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Rhino Lining, Inc., 62 P.3d 142, 149 (Colo. 
2003). 
115. Oswego Laborers’ Local 214 Pension Fund, 647 N.E.2d at 744. 
116. See, e.g., Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc., 719 P.2d at 536. 
117. See Hinkston, supra note 15, at 15.  
118. See, e.g., Haw. Med. Ass‘n v. Haw. Med. Servs. Ass‘n, 148 P.3d 1179, 1207–09 (Haw. 
2003) (describing the legislative history of Hawaii‘s DTPA and amendments providing for private 
causes of action).  
119. David J. Dove, Washington Consumer Protection Act—Public Interest and the Private 
Litigant, 60 WASH. L. REV. 201, 203 (1984); see also Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 
1006 (Wash. 2007); Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 313–14 (Minn. 2000); Zeeman v. Black, 273 
S.E.2d 910, 913–15 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980). 
120. Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 313. 
121. MARY DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW § 5.6 (2009) (explaining 
that courts apply a public interest requirement to avoid entangling consumer protection concerns with 
ordinary contract disputes). 
122. See, e.g., Genesco Entm‘t, Inc. v. Koch, 593 F. Supp. 743, 750–53 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).  
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show that their claim implicates ―consumer protection‖ concerns.123  
South Carolina‘s public interest test is met with a showing that the challenged 
conduct is capable of repetition; however, its supreme court has rejected any 
rigid, bright-line rule to determine how to meet that test.
124
  Colorado‘s test 
requires courts to consider (1) the number of consumers affected by the 
challenged practice; (2) the relative sophistication and bargaining power of 
consumers affected by the challenged practice; and (3) evidence that the 
challenged practice has previously impacted other consumers or has 
significant potential to do so in the future.
125
 
Washington has produced by far the most comprehensive framework for 
addressing the public impact requirement.  The Washington test sets forth 
different factors to ascertain public impact, all of which hinge on the type of 
transaction at issue.
126
  If the transaction is a ―consumer‖ transaction, courts 
consider (1) whether the alleged acts were committed in the course of the 
defendant‘s business; (2) whether the acts are part of a pattern or generalized 
course of conduct; (3) whether repeated acts were committed prior to the act 
causing the plaintiff‘s harm; (4) whether there is a real or substantial potential 
for repetition of the defendant‘s conduct; and (5) if the challenged act 
involved a single transaction, whether many consumers would be affected by 
it.
127
  On the other hand, if the transaction at issue is essentially a private 
contract dispute, courts use a different set of factors to discern a public 
interest: (1) whether the challenged act was committed in the course of the 
defendant‘s business; (2) whether the defendant advertised to the public in 
general; (3) whether the defendant actively solicited the plaintiff, indicating 
solicitation of others; and (4) whether the parties possessed unequal 
bargaining power.
128
  Alternatively, under Washington law, there is a public 
interest per se if the defendant‘s acts violate a statute that contains a 
declaration of public interest—e.g., a public interest in regulating the 
insurance business or automobile retail sales.
129
 
2.  The ―Rascality‖ Standard 
The intermediate standard for separating ordinary breach of contract from 
DTPA-type violations is the ―rascality‖ standard.  This standard holds that 
 
123. Lake County Grading Co. of Libertyville v. Advance Mech. Contractors, Inc., 654 N.E.2d 
1109, 1116 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).  
124. Daisy Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Abbott, 473 S.E.2d 47, 51 (S.C. 1996). 
125. Rhino Linings USA, Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Rhino Lining, Inc., 62 P.3d 142, 149 (Colo. 
2003). 
126. Hangman Riding Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531, 537–38 
(Wash. 1986). 
127. Id. at 538. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
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conduct actionable under deceptive trade practice statutes must ―attain a level 
of rascality that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and 
tumble of the world of commerce.‖130  Courts interpreting DTPA-type statutes 
to require rascality are of the mind that legislatures did not intend these acts to 
supersede the common law of contracts or the U.C.C.
131
  Therefore, a showing 
of egregious conduct in addition to a mere contractual dispute is required to 
obtain the DTPA remedy.
132
  It is not enough that the breach itself was 
intentional,
133
 as in the event of a so-called ―efficient breach‖;134 rather, 
substantial aggravating factors must attend the breach.
135
  States including 
Connecticut,
136
 Kentucky,
137
 Louisiana,
138
 Massachusetts,
139
 North Carolina,
140
 
New Hampshire,
141
 and Rhode Island
142
 follow the rascality standard. 
Courts in jurisdictions following the rascality standard frequently 
distinguish between legitimate profit-seeking activity and deceptive or unfair 
practices.
143
  The Fifth Circuit nicely captured the distinction between lawful 
business pursuits and DTPA-type violations: 
[Louisiana‘s DTPA] does not prohibit sound business 
practices, the exercise of permissible business judgment, or 
appropriate free enterprise transactions.  The statute does not 
forbid a business to do what everyone knows it must do: 
make money.  Businesses in Louisiana are still free to pursue 
 
130. Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc., 396 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979).  The term 
―rascality‖ has itself been subject to much criticism but it remains symbolic of the rule that 
something more malignant than mere breach, such as substantial aggravating circumstances, is 
required to establish a DTPA violation in jurisdictions following this approach.  See Katerina S. 
Callahan, Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A, Section 11: The Evolution of the “Raised 
Eyebrow” Standard, 36 SUFFOLK. U. L. REV. 139, 149–52 (2002). 
131. Levings, 396 N.E.2d at 153. 
132. Bartolomeo v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 889 F.2d 530, 535 (4th Cir. 1989) (applying 
North Carolina law). 
133. Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Thompson, 418 S.E.2d 694, 700 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992). 
134. See generally Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. 
REV. 947 (1982) (discussing the theory of efficient breach—an intentional, opportunistic, but 
beneficial breach—and its defects). 
135. Dalton v. Camp, 548 S.E.2d 704, 712 (N.C. 2001). 
136. Greene v. Orsini, 926 A.2d 708, 710–11 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007). 
137. Capitol Cadillac Olds, Inc. v. Roberts, 813 S.W.2d 287, 291 (Ky. 1991). 
138. Turner v. Purina Mills, Inc., 989 F.2d 1419, 1422 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying Louisiana law). 
139. Mass. Employers Ins. Exch. v. Propac-Mass, Inc., 648 N.E.2d 435, 438 (Mass. 1995). 
140. Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Thompson, 418 S.E.2d 694, 700 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992). 
141. Barrows v. Boles, 687 A.2d 979, 986 (N.H. 1996). 
142. E. Motor Inns, Inc. v. Ricci, 565 A.2d 1265, 1274 (R.I. 1989). 
143. See, e.g., id. (explaining that ―selfish bargaining and business dealings will not be enough 
to justify a claim for damages‖ under DTPA statutes); Barrows, 687 A.2d at 986 (exculpating the 
defendant from DTPA liability because its conduct ―simply fell within the rough edges of 
commercial lending‖). 
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profit, even at the expense of competitors, so long as the 
means used are not egregious.
144
 
An implied rascality standard creates much needed daylight between 
ordinary breach claims and DTPA-type violations, but what exactly 
constitutes aggravating or egregious conduct eludes precise definition.  It is 
clear that whether a breach of contract is imbued with sufficient rascality 
should be a question of law.  However, most of the tests used by courts to 
determine rascality or aggravating circumstances are vague and ad hoc.  
Louisiana‘s ad hoc approach holds that intentional acts of fraud, 
misrepresentation, and deception are covered, but negligence is not.
145
  The 
test in Massachusetts is whether the nature, purpose, and effect of the 
challenged conduct are coercive or extortionate.
146
  For example, a party‘s 
conduct in disregard of known contractual obligations to secure unwarranted 
benefits is viewed as sufficiently egregious to allow DTPA relief.
147
  Courts in 
Connecticut disagree over what is sufficiently aggravating to render a breach 
of contract a DTPA violation.
148
  North Carolina‘s conception of ―aggravating 
circumstances‖ appears to hinge on whether fraud preceded the contract‘s 
formation, whether it occurred in its performance, or whether the defendant 
acted in bad faith.
149
  Kentucky has perhaps the clearest approach.  Its 
supreme court has stated that Kentucky‘s DTPA ―does not apply to simple, 
incompetent performance of contractual duties unless some element of 
intentional or grossly negligent conduct is present.‖150 
3.  Misfeasance 
The narrowest standard for separating ordinary breach of contract from 
DTPA violations is the misfeasance standard.  This approach holds that a 
breach of contract caused by misfeasance is actionable under DTPA-type 
statutes, but not nonfeasance.
151
  Misfeasance amounts to improper 
 
144. Turner v. Purina Mills, Inc., 989 F.2d 1419, 1422 (5th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). 
145. See Marshall v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc., 601 So. 2d 669, 670–71 (La. Ct. App. 1992). 
146. Mass. Employers Ins. Exch. v. Propac-Mass, Inc., 648 N.E.2d 435, 438 (Mass. 1995). 
147. See, e.g., Wang Labs., Inc. v. Bus. Incentives, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 1163, 1166 (Mass. 1986). 
148. See Greene v. Orsini, 926 A.2d 708, 710–11 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007) (―There is a split of 
authority . . . regarding what is necessary to establish a [Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act 
(CUTPA)] claim for breach of contract, the majority of courts holding that a simple breach of 
contract, even if intentional, does not amount to a violation of CUTPA in the absence of substantial 
aggravating circumstances.‖) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
149. See, e.g., Bartolomeo v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 889 F.2d 530, 535 (4th Cir. 1989) (applying 
North Carolina law); Hardy v. Toler, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346 (N.C. 1975). 
150. Capitol Cadillac Olds, Inc., v. Roberts, 813 S.W.2d 287, 291 (Ky. 1991). 
151. See Horowitz v. Fed. Kemper Life Assurance Co., 57 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(explaining that ―[i]n Pennsylvania, only malfeasance, the improper performance of a contractual 
obligation, raises a cause of action‖ under the commonwealth‘s DTPA); 18A SUMM. PA. JUR. 2D 
Commercial Law § 20:25 (explaining that misfeasance, rather than nonfeasance, must be shown to 
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performance of a contractual obligation.  Nonfeasance is the failure to 
perform a contractual obligation at all.  The difference between the two is that 
―misfeasance is active misconduct working positive injury to others and 
nonfeasance is passive inaction or failure to take steps to prevent harm.‖152 
The test promulgated under this standard amounts to the same analysis 
used in these jurisdictions when tort claims are asserted for breach.
153
  The 
mere failure to perform is not a DTPA violation, but rather a breach of 
contract; but defective or improper performance constitutes an independent 
wrong (such as negligence or fraud) and is therefore subject to tort or DTPA 
liability.
154
  For example, in a Texas case, a business made an advance 
purchase of advertising space in a phonebook‘s yellow pages.155  The 
phonebook company failed to publish the ad and the business sued for breach 
of contract and a DTPA violation.
156
  On appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, 
the plaintiff argued that the defendant had represented it would perform the 
contract, and by failing to perform, the defendant had misrepresented that it 
would perform.
157
  The supreme court disagreed, explaining that such 
reasoning ―would convert every breach of contract into a DTPA claim.‖158  
Rather, the court explained that the phonebook company‘s representations 
pertained only to its contractual duty, and a mere failure to fulfill that duty 
could sound only in contract.
159
 
4.  Recommendation 
The mere breach rule is not unreasonable or harsh; it simply separates 
 
establish a violation of the commonwealth‘s DTPA); Margaret Cox, A Light in the Darkness: 
Discerning the Border Between Tort and Contract Claims in Texas Law, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 1023, 
1031–34 (1999) (explaining how failure to perform contractual obligation is not actionable under the 
Texas DTPA whereas defective performance is actionable); DAVID R. DOW & CRAIG SMYSER, 
CONTRACT LAW § 6.4 (2005) (West, Tex. Practice Series No. 49, 2005) (explaining that nonfeasance 
is not actionable under Texas DTPA). 
152. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56 (5th ed. 1984). 
153. See Cox, supra note 151, at 1031–32 (describing the Texas Supreme Court‘s application 
of the tort liability for breach of contract test to a DTPA action); Gordon v. Pa. Blue Shield, 548 A.2d 
600, 604 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (applying the test for discerning tort liability for breach of contract to 
a DTPA action). 
154. The classic statement of this rule is that: 
Ordinarily, a breach of contract is not a tort. . . .  However, a contract may 
furnish the state of things which furnishes the occasion for a tort so that 
negligent performance of a contract may give rise to an action in tort, if the duty 
exists independently of the performance of the contract.   
57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 110 (footnotes omitted). 
155. Crawford v. Ace Sign, Inc., 917 S.W.2d 12, 13–15 (Tex. 1996). 
156. Id. at 14. 
157. Id.  
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
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contract law and DTPA violations into their proper spheres.  Indeed, the 
primary impact of the rule—denying a DTPA remedy for simple breaches—
does not impair parties‘ ability to litigate genuine contract claims under 
contract law or, conversely, true DTPA violations under the DTPA.  The 
tricky part is adopting a test for discerning the appropriate occasion to apply 
the rule. 
Wisconsin‘s test should ultimately lie somewhere between two policy 
goals.  On one hand, courts must consider protecting the efficacy, integrity, 
and reliability of contracts, an institution upon which our system of economic 
exchange depends heavily.  Enforcing contracts freely bargained for and 
entered into in good faith is an end to which the law aspires.
160
  Adopting too 
weak of a mere breach rule would undermine this well-established policy goal 
and risk sweeping benign disputes over freely bargained-for contracts into the 
DTPA meat grinder.  On the other hand, courts must not overrun the 
legislative purpose of the DTPA, which is to eliminate the substantive barriers 
to remedying deceptive trade practices imposed by the common law, such as 
proof of intent.  Thus, prudence counsels against courts reviving rigorous 
common law burdens, such as proof of intent, by way of an overly strong 
mere breach rule. 
Of the three standards described above, the public interest standard seems 
to satisfy both of these goals.  It reflects the need for a reliable system of 
contract-based economic exchange because it would mitigate the threat of 
DTPA interference in every transaction.  Indeed, only contracts that truly 
endanger the Wisconsin public are scrutinized while ordinary or benign 
disputes remain within the purview of contract law.  The public interest 
standard best matches the language, purpose, and history of Wisconsin‘s 
DTPA as well.
161
  As a matter of fact, a federal court in Wisconsin has aligned 
this state‘s DTPA with the statute‘s counterparts in jurisdictions following the 
public interest standard.
162
  The statute‘s language also indicates a general 
concern for protection of the public, which is the public interest standard‘s 
focus.  Moreover, no iteration of the public interest standard would alter the 
status quo of Wisconsin precedent applying the DTPA.  The public interest 
standard does not re-create or simulate any common law burden on recovery.  
Nor would it necessarily exclude single-shot, privately negotiated contracts 
 
160. See, e.g., Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 211, 321 N.W.2d 173, 177 (1982) 
(explaining that courts‘ stated function with respect to contracts is to ―protect each party to a contract 
by ensuring that the promises will be performed . . . [because t]he law protects justifiable 
expectations and the security of transactions‖). 
161. See generally Jeffries, supra note 19 (describing the history and purpose of Wisconsin‘s 
consumer protection laws). 
162. See D & B Auto. Equip., Inc. v. Snap-On, Inc., No. 03-CV-141, 2006 WL 776749, at *7 
(E.D. Wis. Mar. 27, 2006). 
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from its coverage, such as the one in K & S; provided, however, the plaintiff 
can show that a one-time deal affected the public interest.
163
 
B.  Conflict with the U.C.C. 
Because the DTPA casts such a long shadow over contract law, it has a 
tendency to intervene into subject matter already regulated by statute.  When 
the DTPA does intervene, courts should determine whether cross-application 
of the DTPA to other statutes would be appropriate in light of the purposes of 
the other law.  For example, the DTPA applies to the sale of securities, which 
also happens to be the subject of Wisconsin‘s Uniform Securities Act 
(WUSA).
164
  However, courts interpret the WUSA as not providing the 
exclusive remedy for securities-based actions, so it should have no effect on 
DTPA claims in the context of the sale of securities.
165
  The DTPA also 
intervenes in transactions for the sale of goods, which is an area addressed in 
detail by Article 2 of the U.C.C.  Wisconsin courts have given special 
protections to the U.C.C. in the past where actions based on other law threaten 
to undermine its provisions.  For instance, the supreme court has found 
aggrieved purchasers cannot supplement U.C.C. remedies with common law 
misrepresentation claims.
166
  Because the DTPA so closely resembles a 
common law misrepresentation action, it is important for courts to likewise 
consider whether the U.C.C. is, like the WUSA, amenable to cross-application 
of DTPA claims.  It becomes clear almost immediately that that is not the case. 
1.  Identifying the Conflict 
There are three specific areas where cross-application of the DTPA to the 
U.C.C. could be found to contradict specific provisions of the U.C.C.: (1) the 
parol evidence rule;
167
 (2) exclusion or limitation of warranties;
168
 and (3) 
modification or limitation of remedies.
169
  The following examples demonstrate 
that the U.C.C. permits contracting parties to do certain things, such as disclaim 
warranties or modify remedies, with which the DTPA is at complete odds. 
 
163. That is, however, not to say that opinions do not differ on whether the public interest 
standard is a good standard.  See generally Mark, supra note 105, at 234; Cox, supra note 151, at 
207–10, 215–20 (criticizing the public interest standard as overly restrictive). 
164. WIS. STAT. ch. 551 (2007–2008). 
165. Esser Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Steidl, 149 Wis. 2d 64, 67, 437 N.W.2d 884, 885 (1989) 
(holding that the legislature did not intend for the WUSA to supersede common law actions for 
misrepresentation). 
166. See Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 2004 WI App 32, ¶ 30, 270 Wis. 2d 146, 677 
N.W.2d 233. 
167. WIS. STAT. § 402.202 (2007–2008). 
168. Id. § 402.316. 
169. Id. § 402.719. 
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Example A:
170
 Suppose that a husband and wife (the buyers) set out to 
purchase from a manufacturer (the seller) treated wood windows for 
incorporation into the construction of their new home.  The advertising material 
provided by the seller stated that ―all exterior wood is deep-treated to 
permanently protect against rot and decay.‖  Based on this assurance, the buyers 
purchased a number of windows from the seller.  The purchase agreement 
communicated to the buyers contained a limited warranty that stated in effect: 
Seller‘s millwork is warranted for one year after sale to be of 
high-quality workmanship and materials and to be free from 
defects.  THE EXPRESS WARRANTIES SET FORTH 
HEREIN ARE IN LIEU OF ALL OTHER WARRANTIES, 
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, WITHOUT 
LIMITATION, ANY WARRANTIES OF 
MERCHANTABILITY OR OF FITNESS FOR A 
PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 
The agreement also contained an integration clause, which stated: ―This 
Offer contains the entire agreement of the Buyer and Seller regarding the 
transaction.  All prior negotiations and discussions have been merged into this 
Offer.‖  Two years later, the buyers began noticing rot on many of the 
windows it had purchased from the seller.  The rot was apparently caused by 
defects in the treatment chemicals used by the seller—a condition unknown to 
the seller at the time.
171
  They sued the seller later that year for breach of 
warranty and a DTPA violation. 
The legal conclusion here would be that the statement concerning the 
―permanent protection‖ against rot and decay created an express warranty 
under the U.C.C.
172
  The problem is the effect of the limited one-year 
warranty in the actual contract (which had expired) on the ―permanent 
protection‖ statement in the advertisement upon which the buyers based their 
DTPA claim.  The U.C.C. permits parties to modify warranties made prior to 
contracting, as in Example A when the seller‘s final offer contained a one-
year warranty instead of the permanent protection guarantee stated in its 
advertising materials.
173
  Further, by operation of the contract‘s integration 
clause, the U.C.C.‘s parol evidence rule, absent evidence of fraud, should 
preclude the buyers from introducing evidence of the prior permanent 
protection guarantee to contradict the limited warranty to which they 
 
170. The following hypothetical facts are mostly borrowed from Selzer v. Brunsell Bros., 2002 
WI App 232, 257 Wis. 2d 809, 652 N.W.2d 806.  
171. See Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 223 F.3d 873, 877–78 (8th Cir. 
2000) (case preceding Selzer between the Selzers‘ seller and its supplier of wood treatment products 
concerning concealment of defects in the treatment product (PILT) that caused rot). 
172. See Selzer, 2002 WI App 232, ¶ 14. 
173. WIS. STAT. § 402.316. 
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agreed.
174
  The DTPA, by its terms, does not appear to yield to limited 
warranties or the parol evidence rule.
175
  Thus, the issue is whether the seller 
can rely on the U.C.C. and its parol evidence rule to enforce its limited 
warranty or, alternatively, whether such protections permitted by the U.C.C. 
are overrun by the alleged DTPA violation. 
Example B:
176
 An excavation company (the buyer) purchased excavation 
equipment from a dealer under a warranty from the equipment‘s manufacturer 
(the seller).  The seller‘s limited warranty stated in effect: 
Seller hereby warrants that the equipment purchased shall be 
free from defects in material and workmanship for a period of 
six months or 1,000 hours of use, whichever shall occur first.  
This warranty shall be limited to the replacement of such parts 
as shall appear to Seller to have been defective in material or 
workmanship.  Seller shall not be liable for any other cost or 
damages, whether direct, incidental, or consequential, and this 
warranty is in lieu of any and all other warranties, express or 
implied.  The foregoing warranty is in lieu of any and all other 
warranties, express or implied, including but not limited to 
warranties of merchantability and fitness for purpose. 
After only four months and 500 hours of use, the equipment broke down.  
The resulting downtime caused the buyer to lease replacement equipment, incur 
additional labor costs, and lose profits.  The buyer sued the seller for breach of 
warranty and a DTPA violation because the seller represented the equipment 
would be free from defects for 1,000 hours of use when in fact it was not. 
The U.C.C. provides that parties may limit remedies for breach to repair 
and replacement and exclude recovery of consequential damages, as the 
parties did here.
177
  The DTPA is not so constrained; rather, parties may 
recover their pecuniary losses caused by a violation plus attorney‘s fees and 
costs.  Thus, it would appear that the buyer could claim its general damages 
and its consequential damages under the DTPA, and not just repair and 
replacement as agreed to in the contract.  So the issue is whether the seller 
may rely on the U.C.C. to enforce the provision limiting the buyer‘s remedy 
or, alternatively, whether such protections are overridden by the DTPA. 
The questions raised in Examples A and B demonstrate that cross-
 
174. Id. § 402.202. 
175. This proposition is supported by the K & S decision.  But, as mentioned earlier, the court 
of appeals had held prior to K & S that the parol evidence rule could apply to bar evidence 
establishing a DTPA violation.  See Peterson v. Cornerstone Prop. Dev., LLC, 2006 WI App 132, 
¶ 30, 294 Wis. 2d 800, 720 N.W.2d 716. 
176. The following hypothetical facts are borrowed mostly from Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. 
Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 910, 916–918, 437 N.W.2d 213, 215–21 (1989).  
177. WIS. STAT. § 402.719. 
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application of the DTPA to contracts for the sale of goods could render 
unenforceable those contract terms made enforceable by the U.C.C.  In other 
words, the conflict here is that the U.C.C. permits contracting parties to do 
certain things, such as disclaim warranties or modify remedies, with which the 
DTPA is at complete odds.  This is a very close issue.  When it arises, and it 
surely will, how should Wisconsin courts proceed?  Where cross-application 
of torts to the U.C.C. is concerned, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has 
responded unequivocally that tort recovery shall not buttress U.C.C. 
provisions.
178
  But whether the same extends to cross-application of the DTPA 
to the U.C.C. is totally unaddressed in Wisconsin and mostly unexamined in 
other jurisdictions.  However, based on the language and context of the 
U.C.C., one could indeed argue that contract terms executed in compliance 
with Article 2 of the U.C.C. survive cross-application of the DTPA. 
2.  Interpreting Key Statutes 
When a court confronts an inconsistency between statutes, it is the rule 
that a court should reconcile the conflict without nullifying one or the other in 
a manner that will effect legislative intent.
179
  The legislative intent behind the 
U.C.C. is to ―simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial 
transactions.‖180  Specifically, Article 2 of the U.C.C. applies to transactions 
in goods.
181
  Wisconsin courts interpreting Article 2 have found that it 
provides a ―comprehensive system‖ for compensating purchasers of goods for 
economic losses.
182
  The legislative intent of the DTPA is ―to protect the 
residents of Wisconsin from any untrue, deceptive or misleading 
representations‖ made to promote the sale of products, services, real estate, 
securities, or employment.
183
  These broad descriptions of legislative intent 
are not particularly informative because, as described here and elsewhere in 
this Comment, it is already clear that both bodies of law can apply to the same 
subject matter.  The principle of statutory construction where two statutes 
covering the same subject matter conflict is that the more specific statute 
should control.
184
  The fact that the subject matter of Article 2 is limited to the 
 
178. See, e.g., Sunnyslope Grading, Inc., 148 Wis. 2d at 916, 437 N.W.2d at 215. 
179. Colby v. Columbia County, 202 Wis. 2d 342, 349, 550 N.W.2d 124, 127 (1996). 
180. WIS. STAT. § 401.102(2)(a) (2007–2008). 
181. Id. § 402.102. 
182. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec., Inc., 2004 WI 139, ¶ 28, 276 Wis. 2d 361, 688 N.W.2d 
462 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 225 Wis. 2d 305, 342, 592 N.W.2d 
201, 216 (1999)). 
183. K & S Tool & Die Corp. v. Perfection Mach. Sales, Inc., 2007 WI 70, ¶ 21, 301 Wis. 2d 
109, 732 N.W.2d 792 (quoting State v. Automatic Merchs. of Am., Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 659, 663, 221 
N.W.2d 683, 686 (1974)). 
184. In re Doe Petition, 2008 WI 67, ¶ 41, 310 Wis. 2d 342, 750 N.W.2d 873; Lornson v. 
Siddiqui, 2007 WI 92, ¶ 65, 302 Wis. 2d 519, 735 N.W.2d 55; State v. Anthony D.B., 2000 WI 94, 
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sale of goods specifically and the DTPA is concerned with a much broader 
category of items is somewhat helpful in this respect. 
But that the U.C.C. is more specific in scope does not fully resolve the core 
issue.  One could argue that the U.C.C. and the DTPA are equally specific 
regarding the enforcement of contract terms and remedies, the difference being 
the way in which they go about doing it.  The DTPA specifically provides that 
―any assertion, representation or statement of fact‖ is actionable if it is untrue, 
deceptive, or misleading, and that pecuniary losses caused by such 
representations ―shall‖ be recovered.185  The U.C.C. likewise makes such 
representations enforceable, but subject to disclaimer or modification and the 
parol evidence rule.  Further, the U.C.C. remedy is not absolute as with the 
DTPA; parties may vary the terms to modify or limit their remedies. 
The impasse can be resolved by interpreting these laws in relation to 
surrounding, closely related statutes.
186
  In doing so, it is clear that cross-
application of the DTPA may not override contract terms complaint with 
specific U.C.C. provisions.  Any doubt that the legislature intended to protect 
the U.C.C. from other, inconsistent law is removed by section 401.103 of the 
U.C.C., which states: 
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of chs. 401 
to 411 the principles of law and equity, including the law 
merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, 
principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, 
duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or 
invalidating cause shall supplement [the U.C.C.‘s] 
provisions.
187
 
Wisconsin courts have interpreted this provision to mean that although 
other law may ―supplement‖ provisions of the U.C.C., other law cannot 
supplant it.
188
  Claims that exist side by side with the U.C.C. are precluded to 
the extent they conflict with a Code provision.
189
  The DTPA, by its 
construction and application, falls into the category of side-by-side claims 
restricted by this section.  The official 2009 comment to the U.C.C. commends 
this approach when other statutes conflict with the U.C.C.
190
  The comment 
 
¶ 11, 237 Wis. 2d 1, 614 N.W.2d 435. 
185. WIS. STAT. §§ 100.18(1), (11)(b)2 (2007–2008) (emphasis added). 
186. See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 46, 271 Wis. 2d 
633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
187. WIS. STAT. § 401.103. 
188. Weber, Leicht, Gohr & Assocs. v. Liberty Bank, 2000 WI App 249, ¶ 12, 239 Wis. 2d 
461, 620 N.W.2d 472.  
189. United Catholic Parish Schs. of Beaver Dam Ass‘n v. Card Servs. Ctr., 2001 WI App 229, 
¶ 20, 248 Wis. 2d 463, 636 N.W.2d 606. 
190. The official comment to the U.C.C. is not automatically law, but it is persuasive authority.  
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recognizes that state law is becoming more statutory and that legislatures are 
codifying common law and equity principles with increasing frequency.
191
  
Nonetheless, the comment states that ―when the other law relating to a matter 
within the scope of the Uniform Commercial Code is a statute, the principles 
of [section 1-103(3)(b)] remain relevant to the court‘s analysis of the 
relationship between that statute and the Uniform Commercial Code.‖192 
Other provisions support the conclusion that cross-application of the DTPA 
should not contravene U.C.C.-sanctioned contract terms.  Specifically, section 
402.104 of the U.C.C. serves as protection against implicit repeal of its 
provisions by subsequent legislation.  Wisconsin adopted the U.C.C. in 
1963.
193
  The legislature amended the DTPA to create a private cause of action 
in 1970.
194
  Because a private right of action under the DTPA was created after 
the U.C.C., the DTPA‘s cross-application to contracts cannot overrule U.C.C. 
protections by operation of the doctrine of implicit repeal.
195
  Moreover, unlike 
the U.C.C., the DTPA is completely silent as to any preemptive or repellent 
effect it has on other statutory law.  In short, judging from the language, 
structure, and purpose of these statutes, it seems quite clear that contract terms 
permitted under the U.C.C. survive application of the DTPA. 
3.  Summary 
One of the greatest benefits of the U.C.C. is the reliability and 
predictability engendered by its uniformity.
196
  No doubt, many businesses 
and probably whole industries have internalized U.C.C. contracting rules to 
the extent they serve as a gold standard.  The significant invalidating effect 
the DTPA may have on contract terms permitted by the U.C.C. should 
therefore ring at least a few alarm bells.  For example, a seller of goods who, 
in full compliance with the U.C.C., disclaims warranties as a routine business 
practice will want to know: Are my disclaimers enforceable given the DTPA?  
A manufacturer of goods who, in full compliance with the U.C.C., limits its 
liability to repair and replacement as a routine business practice will also want 
to know: Are my contractual remedy limitations enforceable given the DTPA?  
Likewise, buyers will also want to know whether the safety net provided by 
 
Textron Fin. Corp. v. Firstar Bank Wis., 217 Wis. 2d 582, 589, 579 N.W.2d 48, 51 (Ct. App. 1998). 
191. U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 3 (2009). 
192. Id. 
193. Act of July 1, 1963, ch. 158, § 1, 1963 Wis. Sess. Laws 155. 
194. Act of Feb. 12, 1970, ch. 425, secs. 1–2, § 100.18(7), 1969 Wis. Sess. Laws 1389 
(renumbering section 100.18(7) and creating section 100.18(11)(b)–(e)). 
195. Other jurisdictions have added to their DTPA statutes specific ―tie-ins‖ for breach of 
warranty, which are widely interpreted to abrogate the U.C.C. sections at issue here.  See Clifford, 
supra note 34, at 1099. 
196. See Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Introduction to the Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: 
Some Observations of the Past, Present, and Future of the U.C.C., 41 BUS. LAW. 1343, 1353 (1986). 
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the DTPA remains in place even after entering a contract covered by the 
U.C.C.  These questions are incredibly pressing because, without resolution, 
contracting parties will be left to wonder whether compliance with the U.C.C. 
is sufficient to render a term enforceable or whether U.C.C. compliance is 
futile given the threat of DTPA liability.  Considering the strong evidence that 
the legislature intended for U.C.C.-protected terms to survive DTPA claims, 
Wisconsin courts should agree that compliance with the U.C.C. trumps any 
contrary provision under the DTPA. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Unfortunately, it is true that contracts often serve as an excuse for courts 
to ignore socially accepted behavioral norms of honesty and integrity.
197
  It is 
also true that the goal of enforcing bargain contracts sometimes comes at the 
expense of fundamental fairness.
198
  The DTPA, in many respects, serves to 
correct these inequities.
199
  Indeed, there is a utopian promise behind the 
DTPA, pacta sunt servanda,
200
 that no one shall make an assertion, 
representation, or statement of fact that is untrue or misleading with the intent 
to sell a product or service.  A world without the risk of cheats and frauds is 
very much an ideal one, and a penumbral duty emanating from the DTPA to 
―be as good as your word‖ would help glean these unscrupulous individuals 
from the ranks of the honest; it could drive the defectors out by imposing 
impossibly high costs for being sharp. 
However, the vast majority of contracts protect legitimate, honest 
agreements freely bargained for in good faith.  Further, the institution of 
contracts allows our society to grow and prosper by providing an efficient and 
reliable means to accumulate, distribute, and invest resources.  Our system of 
exchange erodes a tiny bit with every case that ignores an enforceable contract.  
And although it is possible to characterize good contracting practices—and by 
implication free enterprise and profit-making activity—as against public policy, 
that is not the aim of Wisconsin‘s DTPA and its cognates.  So it is troubling that 
the supreme court has begun to construe the DTPA in such a way that allows 
courts to set aside valid agreements with ease.  Indeed, without breaking a 
sweat, the K & S court completely ignored the parties‘ contract and imposed 
DTPA liability as a matter of law.  To be sure, the DTPA serves a very 
important purpose, and is very adept at doing so; however, clever litigants are 
using its relaxed substantive requirements to litigate benign contract disputes, 
and in doing so, obtain unwarranted strategic advantages.  The DTPA was not 
 
197. Shell, supra note 34, at 1244–45. 
198. Edwards, supra note 13, at 656, 660–61. 
199. Shell, supra note 34, at 1235. 
200. ―All promises must be kept.‖   
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intended to be abused in this way.  Even those who support use of DTPA 
statutes as a contract remedy recommend certain restraints to prevent such 
abuses.
201
  Thus, it would be very beneficial for Wisconsin courts to check this 
precedent before it grows too strong by adopting prudential limitations such as 
the mere breach rule and enforcement of the U.C.C. over DTPA claims. 
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